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MONMOUTH COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS; SERENA 
DIMASO, ESQ., in her official capacity as Monmouth County Chosen  
Freeholder; THOMAS A. ARNONE, in his official capacity as Monmouth  
County Chosen Freeholder; GARY RICH, in his official capacity as  
Monmouth County Chosen Freeholder; LILLIAN BURRY, in her official 
capacity as Monmouth County Chosen Freeholder; MICHAEL FITZGERALD, 
ESQ., in his individual and official capacity as County Counsel; TERI  
O’CONNOR, in her individual and official capacity as County Administrator; 
PATRICK IMPREVEDUTO, in his official capacity as Monmouth County 
Chosen Freeholder; GERRY P. SCHARFENBERGER, in his individual 
capacity and as Monmouth County Chosen Freeholder 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-17-cv-12300) 
District Judge:  Honorable Brian R. Martinotti 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 30, 2020 
 
BEFORE: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
 












GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes on before this Court on the appeal of Plaintiff-Appellant John 
Curley who challenges the District Court’s orders dated July 25, 2018, and April 29, 
2019,1 dismissing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) his amended complaint and 
denying his motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 for leave to amend his complaint 
further.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.  
  
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
From 2010-2018, Curley was an elected freeholder on the Monmouth County 
Board of Chosen Freeholders (the “Board”), the County government governing body.  
According to Curley, although a Republican, he “has been a persistent and regular  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 The July 25, 2018 Order dismissed without prejudice Curley’s First Amended 
Complaint.  The April 29, 2019 Order dismissed his Second Amended Complaint and 
denied him leave to file a Third Amended Complaint.  The Court’s opinions may be 
found at 2018 WL 3574880 (D.N.J. July 25, 2018) and 2019 WL 1895065 (D.N.J. Apr. 
29, 2019).  Curley informed the District Court in correspondence dated May 3, 2019, that 
he did not intend to seek leave to file another amended complaint.  Accordingly, the 




advocate of positions that run contrary to” those of the Republican members of the 
Board, and to the County’s Republican leadership.  (Second Amended Complaint 
(“SAC”) ¶ 3.) 
In June 2017, Defendants Michael Fitzgerald (“Fitzgerald”) and Teri O’Connor 
(“O’Connor”), respectively the County counsel and County administrator, hired Mary 
Catherine Cuff, a retired New Jersey appellate judge, to investigate a sexist comment 
Curley allegedly made at the May 2017 Bradley Beach, Monmouth County, Memorial 
Day parade.  On October 13, 2017, Cuff issued a report (the “Report”), which examined 
the grievance and other allegations to the end that Curley had engaged in sexually 
harassing and/or sexist behavior.  Ultimately, Cuff determined that many of the 
allegations made against Curley were credible.2    
Fitzgerald distributed the Report to the Board which led to the Board having a 
special meeting on November 29, 2017, in an executive session.  The Board discussed the 
Report at the special meeting following which Curley gave a letter and memorandum 
prepared by his attorney to the Board voicing Curley’s objections to the proceedings. But 
Curley did more than complain because he instituted this action on December 1, 2017. 
After the November 29, 2017 meeting, Fitzgerald notified Curley that the Board 
would hold a special meeting on December 4, 2017, to consider two resolutions—one to 
amend the County’s discrimination policy and another to censure Curley.  In the 
 
2 Not all of the allegations against Curley were sexual in nature, but Cuff found that 
Curley’s actions supported an inference that his conduct was sexually discriminatory 
and/or created a hostile work environment. 
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meantime, O’Connor prohibited Curley from: (1) entering the Hall of Records, a 
Monmouth County building in which Curley had his office, except that he could enter 
when he was conducting official County business, and (2) having contact with any 
County employee, including his own aide.  Although those restrictions remained in place 
for two days,3 notwithstanding the prohibition, Curley returned to the Hall of Records to 
“fulfill[] his duties as an elected [f]reeholder.”  (SAC ¶ 152.)  At the special meeting,4 the 
Board unanimously voted to adopt the resolution to censure Curley and later read the 
censure into the record at the following public Board session.  
Curley alleges that following the adoption of the censure resolution, Defendants 
prevented him from performing his elected duties in a variety of ways, such as: giving 
him “minimal oversight over far fewer divisions and programs within the County” than 
he had had previously; O’Connor “attempted to usurp” Curley’s role on various oversight 
committees; and Fitzgerald prevented Curley from seeking effective legal advice.  (SAC 
¶¶ 191-95.)  Fitzgerald and O’Connor also retained Cuff to perform an additional 
investigation, and on November 5, 2018, Fitzgerald released the agenda for a November 
8, 2018 Board meeting, which included a proposed resolution to authorize Cuff to 
conduct a third investigation.  Curley objected to Fitzgerald’s releasing the agenda on the 
day preceding the November 6, 2018 freeholder election at which Curley was a losing 
 
3 When Curley initiated this action he sought temporary restraints and a preliminary 
injunction.  The parties appeared before the District Court on December 4, 2017, and 
ultimately agreed to the dissolution of the restrictions against Curley and to the filing of 
the Report under seal.   
 
4 The special meeting was adjourned to December 8, 2017. 
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independent candidate as he believed the release would negatively affect his bid for 
reelection.   
While the Board proceedings went on, this litigation that Curley already had 
instituted continued.  Curley pleaded claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Jersey law, 
principally on the theory that Defendants retaliated against him for his anti-Republican 
Party actions as a freeholder in violation of his rights to free speech.  In particular, he 
pleaded that “Defendants’ actions . . . were intended to prevent [him] from engaging in 
constitutionally protected speech in furtherance of his position as a [f]reeholder.”  (SAC 
¶ 203.) 
In his Second Amended Complaint, Curley included a section entitled, “Curley’s 
Political Positions Put[] Him at Odds with the County Republican Establishment.”  (SAC 
p. 11).  He then summarized positions he took on certain matters contrary to that of the 
establishment including:  (1) “Opposition to ‘Good Old Boys’ Club”; (2) “Exposing 
Corruption at Brookdale Community College”; (3) “Opposition to Lucas Land Deal”; 
(4) “Conflict Over Authorization for County Healthcare for Freeholders”; 
(5) “Opposition to County Wellness Center”; (6) “Sale of County Owned Nursing 
Home”; (7) “Opposition to Howell Township Solid Waste Facility”; and (8) “Monmouth 
County Tax Board.”  (SAC pp. 11-18.)  In his Second Amended Complaint, Curley set 
forth details of these matters and explained his opposition to the County Republican 
establishment on these points.  Notably, the last of his acts that can be characterized as a 
free speech matter was in 2015.   
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The District Court dismissed Curley’s First Amendment claim and declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims.  This appeal followed. 
  
III.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(a), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo a 
district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted.  Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 353 (3d Cir. 2018).  In determining 
whether a plaintiff has stated a claim that can survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6), “we accept all well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.  However, we disregard threadbare recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and conclusory statements.”  City of 
Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d 872, 878-79 (3d Cir. 
2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “A claim has facial plausibility 
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Zuber v. Boscov’s, 871 
F.3d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 
1937, 1949 (2009)).  Though we ordinarily review a district court’s “denial of leave to 
amend for abuse of discretion[,] we review de novo its determination that amendment 
would be futile.”  United States ex rel. Schumann v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., 769 F.3d 




IV.  DISCUSSION 
To successfully plead a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege 
that he or she engaged in: “(1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) [there was] 
retaliatory action [against him or her] sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness 
from exercising his [or her] constitutional rights, and (3) [there was] a causal link 
between the constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action.”  Thomas v. 
Independence Township, 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006).  As a general matter, for 
Defendants’ alleged retaliatory conduct to be actionable, that conduct must have had 
more than a de minimis impact on Curley’s First Amendment rights.  See McKee v. Hart, 
436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006); Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 419 (3d Cir. 2003).     
 Here, we find Curley failed to plead facts plausibly indicating a causal connection 
between his conduct and the alleged retaliatory acts.  A plaintiff must establish that there 
is a causal connection between the constitutionally protected conduct and the alleged 
retaliatory action because if a defendant would have engaged in the actions it did even if 
the plaintiff had not engaged in his or her conduct it cannot be said that the allegedly 
retaliatory act infringed the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.  In this case significant 
time has passed between the last of the anti-establishment conduct in which Curley 
engaged and Defendants’ actions that Curley claims retaliated against him for his 
conduct.  Though that time lapse does not necessarily mean that Defendants did not take 
their actions to retaliate against Curley for his conduct, this passage of time and lack of 
corroborating evidence renders Curley’s claims implausible.  See e.g., Lauren W. ex rel. 
Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007).  
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Although our precedent holds that “unusually suggestive temporal proximity” is 
only one way a retaliation plaintiff can plead causation, see Mirabella v. Villard, 853 F.3d 
641, 652 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted), “there is no bright line rule for the time that 
may pass between protected speech and what constitutes actionable retaliation,” Canard 
v. Pa. State Police, 902 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 2018).  Still, we have allowed 
time-attenuated retaliation claims to proceed to discovery where there is a “pattern of 
antagonism” that sheds light on the “timing of events” enough to justify an inference of 
causation.  Canard, 902 F.3d at 184 (citation omitted); see Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 
267.  Absent factual allegations that could support a finding of causation, a significant 
period of time between the alleged protected conduct and retaliatory acts is fatal to the 
retaliation claim.  See, e.g., Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 512–13 (3d Cir. 
2003) (involving a gap of approximately a year and a half).  And ultimately, if the scales 
are even and the plaintiff has pleaded facts that indicate a “mere possibility of” a causal 
connection, dismissal is appropriate.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
Here, however, there is a gap of two and half years between the latest protected 
conduct and the earliest retaliatory act pleaded in Curley’s complaint.  And while 
Curley’s allegations of protected conduct go back to 2008, the complaint contains no 
specific allegations indicating any “pattern of antagonism” on the part of Defendants, or 
for that matter any other allegations giving rise to an inference of causation.  In his briefs 
on appeal, Curley asserts that Defendants, after years of “simmering resentment,” “seized 
the opportunity to retaliate against [him] beginning in June 2017.”  (Appellant’s Reply 
Br. at 10.)  But “simmering” here is a synonym for “invisible,” and none of Curley’s 
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factual allegations, even if assumed true, provides a basis for a finding of the critical 
causal link between protected speech and retaliatory acts.  For that reason, Curley’s 
complaint failed to plead a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim 
Moreover, in addressing the merits of this appeal, Curley contends that the District 
Court erred in dismissing his action because the Court invoked an “overly onerous 
standard” in that it required Curley to plead “severe” conduct by Defendants for his 
complaint to survive their motions to dismiss.  We disagree with Curley’s position on this 
point.  The Court correctly applied our relevant precedent in reaching its conclusion, and 
repeatedly explained that to be actionable, conduct must interfere with an elected 
official’s “ability to adequately perform [his or her] elected duties.”  Werkheiser v. 
Pocono Township, 780 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 2015).  Taken in context, a statement that 
the Court made referencing an issue of the severity of Defendants’ allegedly retaliatory 
conduct merely reinforced its conclusion that Curley did not allege that the conduct in 
which Defendants engaged interfered with his performance of his elective duties.  Thus, 
the Court applied the correct standard and did not place an enhanced pleading burden on 
Curley.5  Nonetheless, in light of our conclusion that Curley has failed to plead causation, 
 
5 Curley asks us to analyze whether the issue of “severity” of a defendant’s conduct is a 
factual matter that must be determined by a jury.  But the case on which Curley relies on 
this point, Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399 (3d Cir. 2003), is distinguishable from this 
case in that it concerns a public employee to whom different rules apply than those 
applicable to an elected public official on a governing body.  Moreover, the assessment of 
severity is seemingly more of a legal than factual matter in which a court should make the 
assessment.  See e.g., Bonkowski v. Oberg Indus. Inc., 787 F.3d 199, 203 (3d Cir. 2015).  




we need not address the District Court’s application of that standard to the facts alleged 
in his Second Amended Complaint.   
Because Curley did not sufficiently plead a First Amendment retaliation claim, we 
will affirm the District Court’s July 25, 2018 and April 29, 2019 Orders dismissing the 
action and denying the motion to amend.  Inasmuch as Curley’s First Amendment 
retaliation claims fail, we will not address Defendants’ arguments pertaining to legislative 
and qualified immunity.   
